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This experimental study examines both spontaneous and strategically planned behavior of boundedly rational sub- jects in a dynamic duopoly situation. Spontaneous behavior is observed in game-playing experiments where students from the University of Bonn have played the dynamic duopoly game by direct interaction via computer terminals. Strategically planned behavior isrevealed in strategies developed by forty-five academic economists from 12 countries. These strategies are played against each other in computer simulations. The most striking observation in both types of examination is the coexistence of cooperation and competition. Short-run monopoly pricing emerges as the prevailing mode of cooperation in the planned strategies. However, the most successful strategies turn out to be moderately competitive. An evolutionary tournament suggests a long-run coexistence of competition and cooperation

Für die einen gilt: "Nur Warnhinweise auf Lebensmitteln können vor der Volksseuche Übergewicht noch retten." Für die anderen hingegen ist klar: "Eine rote Ampel auf kalorienreichen Lebensmitteln bedeutet eine unerträgliche Entmündigung der Bürger." Die aktuelle Kontroverse um die von der EU vorangetriebene Nährwertkennzeichnung von Lebensmitteln zeigt: Verbraucherpolitische Debatten werden häufig mit besonderer Schärfe geführt - und im Streit um grundlegende menschliche Verhaltensweisen beim Konsum geht es schnell ums Menschenbild. In dieser Situation kann die experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung dazu beitragen, dem Streit darüber "wie Verbraucher wirklich ticken" festen Boden zu geben. Dabei geht es nicht allein darum, theoretische Grundannahmen über den Homo oeconomicus zu bestätigen oder zu verwerfen. Auch bei konkreten politischen Gestaltungsfragen - etwa im Streit über eine freiwillige oder obligatorische Ampelkennzeichnung - können verhaltensorientierte Experimente Auskunft geben, inwieweit einzelne Maßnahmen überhaupt zu den erklärten politischen Zielen beitragen.

We run a laboratory experiment where some participants are selected to make investment decisions on behalf of others. We test whether a democratic context influences the social preferences of decision makers in terms of efficiency, altruism and concern for inequality. We find that decision makers who are selected democratically are generally more efficiency-oriented, but also more altruistic, than leaders who are selected at random or by ability. Because wealth generation and distribution sometime conflict, efficiency is no higher with democratic leaders, although payoffs are more equal. We interpret our results in terms of a democratic norm that mitigates how elections may otherwise lead to an enhanced feeling of entitlement to one's role. We exclude a selection effect and discuss the drivers of our results in terms of belief in the legitimacy of the selection procedure and reduced social distance.

This dissertation extends the understanding of asymmetric group behavior in the provision of public goods. Previous studies, using an asymmetric framework, have so far focused on situations where all players profit form the social optimum. The discussion in the first paper breaks with this tradition and the results show how strong inequalities may decrease group contributions, as the high endowment players only contributes a small share of their endowments. This is in contrast to experiments using a weaker asymmetry, which indicate that players tend to contribute a fair-share of their endow...

This dissertation extends the understanding of asymmetric group behavior in the provision of public goods. Previous studies, using an asymmetric framework, have so far focused on situations where all players profit form the social optimum. The discussion in the first paper breaks with this tradition and the results show how strong inequalities may decrease group contributions, as the high endowment players only contributes a small share of their endowments. This is in contrast to experiments using a weaker asymmetry, which indicate that players tend to contribute a fair-share of their endow...